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deny bootstrap jurisdiction of a wage claim.
BROOKS D. KUBIK
III. ANTITRUST
A. Predatory Intent is an Essential Element of a Union's
Antitrust Violation
The collective bargaining process' represents a conflict between the
policy of the antitrust laws to discourage combinations which restrain
competition2 and a policy of the labor acts to encourage worker organiza-
tion.' The Supreme Court has partially reconciled this conflict in favor of
Collective bargaining, as contemplated by the National Labor Relations Act
(N.L.R.A.), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976), is a procedure for reaching a collective agreement
between an employer and a union concerning wages, hours, and other conditions of employ-
ment. See id& § 157. Both the employer and the employees' representative have an equal
obligation to bargain collectively. Id § 158(d). The bargaining parties have a responsibility
to deal fairly with each other and to overcome disagreements. N.L.R.B. v. Montgomery
Ward & Co., 133 F.2d 676, 684 (9th Cir. 1943). Refusal by either party to bargain collectively
and in good faith is an unfair labor practice. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), 158(b)(3) (1976). Unfair
labor practices are subject to both injunctive and affirmative relief. Id § 160(c).
2 Congress has encouraged free competition by prohibiting every contract, combina-
tion or conspiracy in restraint of trade. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976). The Supreme
Court also has indicated that the objective of the antitrust laws is to preserve unen-
cumbered competition. See Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 57-58
(1911). The Court has narrowly construed the Sherman Act so that only unreasonable
restraints of trade are illegal. Id. at 59-60. See generally Masterson, Antitrust Law Com-
mentary, 44 BROOKLYN L. REv. 801 (1978).
1 The Wagner Act, (National Labor Relations Act), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1976), and
the Taft-Hartley Act, (Labor Management Relations Act), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-144, 171-187
(1976), favor collective bargaining as a means of peacefully settling industrial disputes. The
Director of the President's Council on Wage and Price Stability has remarked that a com-
petitive labor market is extremely cruel and inhumane, and therefore undesirable. 48 ANTI-
TRUST L.J. 909, 910 (1979). Courts also have reaffirmed congressional support of the collec-
tive bargaining process as a legitimate means of promoting both workers' and the public in-
terests. See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967); N.L.R.B. v. Laney & Duke Storage
Warehouse Co., 424 F.2d 109, 113 (5th Cir. 1970); Sachs v. Davis & Hemphill, Inc;, 295 F.
Supp. 142, 149 (D. Md. 1969). See also 4 KHEEL. LABOR LAW § 16.01 (rev. ed. 1979).
Although the labor laws aim to eliminate worker competition, the antitrust laws aim
to enforce such competition. See notes 1 & 2 supra. See also Mann, Powers & Roberts, The
Accomodation Between Antitrust and Labor Law: The Antitrust Labor Exemption, 9
SETON HALL L. REV. 744, 745 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Mann]. Congress attempted to
reconcile the conflict between the labor and antitrust policies by exempting unilateral labor
activities from the antitrust laws. Mann, supra, at 745. For example, under the Clayton Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1976), a person's labor is not a commodity or article of commerce, and
therefore, the federal antitrust laws cannot prohibit labor organizations from using effec-
tive means to meet their legitimate aims. The Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115
(1976), prohibits judicial interference with labor's exertion of economic force. The Supreme
Court limited the exemption of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to situations where the union
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labor organization by establishing an antitrust exemption for collective
bargaining.' A collective bargaining agreement is not exempt from the-
antitrust laws, however, if a union agrees with an employer to impose
the collective bargaining agreement on other employers in -the industry.
5
Although such an industry-wide agreement is subject to antitrust provi-
sions, the union will not actually violate the antitrust laws unless the
agreement demonstrates predatory intent by the union to eliminate in-
dustry competitors.' In Smitty Baker Coal Company, Inc. v. United Mine
Workers of America,7 the Fourth Circuit reviewed the collective
bargaining antitrust exemption in the context of a union's attempt to im-
pose an agreement on an employer who was not a party to the original
collective bargaining agreement.
Ralph Baker, operator of Smitty Baker Coal Company, brought an
antitrust action against the United Mine Workers (UMW), alleging that
the UMW had conspired with the Bituminous Coal Operators Associa-
tion (BCOA), a multi-employer group, to restrain trade.' Baker leased
mining lands from a coal company that had signed the UMW - BCOA col-
lective bargaining agreement as a member of the BCOA.9 The lessor re-
quired Baker to sign the same collective bargaining agreement with the
does not combine with a non-labor group, by means of strikes, boycotts, and picketing.
United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 231-37 (1941). The Court in Hutcheson excluded
collective bargaining from the statutory exemption because collective bargaining required
agreement with a non-labor group. Id. at 232; see Mann, supra, at 748.
' Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 502-03 (1940). The Supreme Court exemp-
ted collective bargaining from the antitrust laws by limiting the Sherman Act prohibitions
to commercial competition, not wage competition. Id. at 503-04. Collective bargaining
restricts worker competition over wages and conditions of employment, but does not
significantly affect competition in the employer's products market. Without a direct effect
on price competition in the products market, the Sherman Act does not apply. Id. The Court
justified the collective bargaining exemption by noting congressional intent to support labor
unions in the Norris-LaGuardia and Wagner Acts. Id. at 504 n.24. Collective bargaining is a
legitimate union practice in spite of the fact that a bargaining union is no longer acting
unilaterally. See The Supreme Court; 1974 Term, 89 HARv. L. Rav. 47, 236 & n.13 (1975).
In Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797 (1945), the Supreme Court
qualified the collective bargaining exemption by holding that a union lost immunity from
the antitrust laws by helping businesses control the products market. Id. at 809. The Court
held that to be exempt, the union must act in its own self interest without aiding nonlabor
groups to achieve their own anti-competitive goals. Id. at 810.
" United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 665-66 (1965); see text accompa-
nying notes 32-40 infra.
' United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. at 670-72. In Pennington, Justice
Douglas concluded that no antitrust violation should be found absent an intent to eliminate,
destroy or ruin competitors. Id. at 673-75 (Douglas, J., concurring); see text accompanying
notes 38-40 infra.
7 620 F.2d 416 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 207 (1980).
' Smitty Baker Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 457 F. Supp. 1123, 1124 (W.D. Va.
1978), affd, 620 F.2d 416 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 207 (1980).
620 F.2d at 419.
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UMW as a condition for leasing the lands." Prior to 1960, the standard
UMW-BCOA contract included a Protective Wage Clause (PWC), which
required all employers in the industry to adhere to the contract not-
withstanding that some of the employers did not participate in
negotiating the contract." The UMW and BCOA expressly rescinded the
PWC in 1968, and the PWC was not included in the agreement that
Baker signed."
The Smitty Baker mine operated profitably until Baker closed his
mine due to a UMW strike following the expiration of the UMW - BCOA
agreement." For the period after the agreement expired, Baker had of-
fered to pay retroactively whatever wages the UMW and BCOA agreed
upon in the new contract."' The UMW refused Baker's offer." Baker
subsequently signed a collective bargaining agreement with the
Southern Labor Union (SLU), which purported to be the miners' new
union representative. 6 The next day, the UMW requested Baker to sign
an agreement to the new contract that the UMW had negotiated with
BCOA." Baker refused on the basis that his agreement with SLU
10 Id. The agreement contained a Coal Lands Clause, which required that all
signatories agree not to lease out any coal lands as a means of circumventing the collective
bargaining agreement. The Clause therefore required the lessor to obtain Baker's signature
to the agreement. Id..
" United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 660 (1965). During the 1950's, the
UMW agreed with the BCOA not to oppose or restrain mechanization of the coal mining in-
dustry, even though mechanization reduced the work force. In return, BCOA agreed to
significantly increased wages for the remaining workers, which only the highly mechanized
operators could afford. Id. The resulting Protective Wage Clause (PWC) was first included
in the 1958 collective bargaining agreement between the UMW and BCOA. 620 F.2d at 425.
The clause specifically. provided that the UMW would not agree to any working conditions
with any employer other than the conditions listed in the agreement. Id. at 425-26 & n.24.
" 624 F.2d at 434. In United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965), the
Supreme Court held that enforcement of the PWC is an antitrust violation. Id. at 665-66; see
text accompanying notes 33-40 infra. Accordingly, the UMW and BCOA have omitted the
PWC from their agreements since 1968. 620 F.2d at 434.
11 620 F.2d at 419. Although the collective bargaining agreement between the UMW
and BCOA required that the UMW give the employer 60 days notice prior to a strike, the
UMW did not notify Baker personally. Since the UMW notified BCOA as the original
negotiating party, Baker was informally notified of the strike. Id.
' Id. at 419-20.
SId. at 420. The UMW refused to work for Smitty Baker under stipulation without a
contract because of the union's policy of "no contract, no work." Id.
16 Id. During the UMW strike against Smitty Baker, the Southern Labor Union (SLU}
presented Baker with six signatures of Smitty Baker employees to show that SLU was the
employee's chosen collective bargaining representative. In the absence of a showing that a
majority of the employees regarded SLU as their representative, the UMW remained the
bargaining agent. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976); see Terrell Machine Co. v. N.L.R.B., 427 F.2d
1088, 1090 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 929 (1970).
17 620 F.2d at 420. The new UMW - BCOA agreement had been signed and publicized
prior to Baker's agreement with SLU. Baker testified, however, that he had no knowledge
of the UMW - BCOA agreement until after he signed with SLU. Id.
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precluded him from contracting with the UMW.'8
The UMW brought an unfair labor practice charge against Baker
and SLU for encroaching upon the UMW's right to represent the
employees of Smitty Baker.'9 The UMW dropped the charges after the
SLU voided its contract with Smitty Baker."0 Baker then renewed his in-
terest in the UMW contract.2' During negotiations, Baker claimed that
Smitty Baker could not afford to pay the higher wages in the new con-
tract and proposed reinstituting the old contract.' After further unsuc-
cessful negotiations, Baker liquidated Smitty Baker Coal Company and
started a new mining operation on a new site with SLU as the miners'
representative body.'
Baker brought suit in a federal district court 4 under the Sherman
Act, claiming that the UMW had conspired with the BCOA to restrain
trade by covertly imposing the Protective Wage Clause on the
industry.' The UMW's antitrust liability depended upon whether there
was a conspiracy between the UMW and BCOA, and whether Smitty
Baker's injuries resulted from that conspiracy.26 The district court
granted judgment for the defendant UMW notwithstanding a jury ver-
dict for Smitty Baker.Y
iId.
SId- To bargain with a rival union while the certified union is still the presumed
bargaining agent may be an unfair labor practice. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5) (1976); see N.L.R.B.
v. Trosch, 321 F.2d 692, 696-97 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 993 (1964); note 15
supra. See generally R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW, ch XX § 1 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as GORMAN].
620 F.2d at 420.
1 Id. at 420-21. As a prerequisite to signing the new contract with the UMW, Baker re-
quested formal notification that the unfair labor practice charges regarding SLU had been
dropped. Id. at 421.
1 Id. Baker refused to allow the UMW to examine his books to determine whether he
could afford the higher wage in the new contract. Id. The duty to bargain provision of § 8(d)
of the N.L.R.A., 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976), requires an employer to open his books so that the
union may bargain on an informed basis. An employer's unreasonable failure to open his
books on request is a per se unfair labor practice. See GORMAN, supra note 19, at 399-401.
See also N.L.R.B. v. Southland Cork Co., 342 F.2d 702, 705-06 (4th Cir. 1965).
1 620 F.2d at 421. During negotiations, the UMW offered to perform maintenance and
repair work in the mine, but Baker declined on the basis that the repair work would cost
more than he could afford. Id.
U Smitty Baker Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 457 F. Supp. 1123 (W.D. Va. 1978).
Id. at 1128-29; see notes 10-12 supra. Baker also claimed that the UMW's strike in
response to the expiration of their contract was illegal because the union did not comply
with a contract provision that required the union to give Baker 60 days notice before strik-
ing. Id. at 1133; see note 13 supra. Baker also claimed that the UMW's refusal to negotiate
indicated that the union was attempting to enforce the PWC. 457 F. Supp. at 1129.
' 457 F. Supp. at 1124. For purposes of § 1 of the Sherman Act, agreements which
violate the Act may be either express or inferred. See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United
States, 175 U.S. 211, 240 (1899) (express); American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S.
781, 809 (1946) (inferred). In either case, § 1 can only be violated if there are two separate en-
tities acting together. See L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 108 (1977).
1 457 F. Supp. at 1130. The court held that a jury could reasonably find that UMW and
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On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment
for UMW.' The court held that there was no antitrust conspiracy be-
tween the UMW and BCOA because Baker had failed to demonstrate
that the union had acted with predatory intent.' The court also noted
that the UMW strike, which had caused Baker's alleged injuries, was a
unilateral activity by the union."0 Since there was no evidence of
predatory intent by the union and no evidence of actual collaboration be-
tween the UMW and BCOA, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the anti-
trust laws were inapplicable. 1
The Fourth Circuit in Smitty Baker relied on United Mine Workers
v. Pennington" to determine that no antitrust conspiracy existed be-
tween UMW and BCOA. In Pennington, the Supreme Court held that
the UMW and BCOA violated the antitrust laws by conspiring through
the Protective Wage Clause to impose an industry-wide wage rate on all
employers, regardless of their ability to pay.' Although the Pennington
Court unanimously agreed that the UMW's imposition of the PWC was
an antitrust violation, the majority did not agree on the supporting ra-
tionale.' The Pennington Court reasoned that a union may unilaterally
attempt to impose the same wage terms on the industry without anti-
trust implications because the union is within the statutory exemption
for unilateral union activity. If the attempt to impose an industry-wide
wage rate is in furtherance of an agreement between the union and some
employers, however, the union is subject to the antitrust laws because
the union is no longer acting only in its own interest. 8 The Court also
noted that the industry-wide wage agreement prevented the union from
BCOA conspired to restrain trade, but could not reasonably find damages resulting
therefrom. Id. The district court reasoned that since the PWC of 1958 was ambiguous, the
jury could consider the PWC as evidence of a conspiracy. Id. The strike and not the con-
spiracy, however, was a possible proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. Id. at 1131-34.
Baker appealed the judgment n.o.v., and the UMW cross-appealed the finding of a con-
spiracy. 620 F.2d at 418.
620 F.2d at 438.
Id.; see text accompanying notes 41-51 infra.
620 F.2d at 437-38; see note 51 infra.
81 620 F.2d at 437; see note 26 supra.
381 U.S. 657 (1965); see text accompanying notes 5-7 supra.
381 U.S. at 665; see notes 11 & 12 supra.
381 U.S. at 672. The Pennington Court split evenly into three groups of three
Justices each. Justice White wrote the majority opinion, Justice Douglas authored the con-
currence, and Justice Goldberg spoke for a third group that concurred in the result.
u Id. at 665. Justice White recognized that a legitimate aim of any union is to obtain
uniformity of standards regardless of anticompetitive effects. Id. at 666, citing Apex
Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 503 (1940).
' 381 U.S. at 665-66. The Pennington Court reasoned that employers may not lawfully
conspire to eliminate competitors and a union will be liable as a party to that conspiracy if it
participates through the collective bargaining agreement. Id.
[Vol. XXXVIII
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meeting its duty to bargain because it did not freely bargain with each*
and every employer s'
In a concurring opinion in Pennington, Justice Douglas interpreted
the Court's opinion as a reaffirmation of the doctrine that an activity
which would otherwise be an antitrust violation is not exempt merely
because labor is involved.' Therefore, the antitrust laws apply to a
union participating in an industry-wide wage agreement, and the labor
exemption will not apply. 9 Justice Douglas emphasized that a union
would violate the antitrust laws only if the agreement showed a purpose
by the union to eliminate competitors, whereas the majority opinion did
not specifically require a showing of predatory intent."
The Fourth Circuit in Smitty Baker interpreted Pennington to re-
quire the plaintiff to show four facts to prove that a union has violated
the antitrust laws. According to Smitty Baker, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the union and the employer group have established a
wage agreement, that the union and the employer group knew that the
smaller employer could not afford the wage scale, that the union attemp-
ted to impose the wage scale on all employers including those not parties
to the original agreement, and that the union intended to eliminate the
smaller operators. 1
" Id. The Pennington Court reasoned that a union has an obligation to respond to each
bargaining situation and must not preclude itself from bargaining by virtue of a prior agree-
ment with other parties. Id. Although the Court cited no authority for the unit by unit
theory, the NLRA duty to bargain, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1976), may be supportive. See note 1
supra. Common sense dictates that bargaining has not actually occurred unless the two
bargaining parties have engaged in give-and-take negotiation. Prior agreements which set a
standard rate preclude any such negotiation. See note 22 supra.
Commentators have criticized the Court's "unit by unit" theory as the announcement
of a new per se rule, see note 55 infra, which is lacking the requisite finding of pernicious ef-
fect. DiCola, Labor-Antitrust: Pennington, Jewel Tea and Subsequent Meandering, 33 U.
PiTT. L. REV. 705, 716-17 (1972) [hereinafter cited as DiCola]. DiCola argues that under the
unit by unit theory, if a union limits its freedom to bargain according to each individual cir-
cumstance, the agreement will violate the antitrust laws regardless of the union's motive,
which may have been both legitimate and practical. Id
381 U.S. at 672 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Douglas relied on Allen Bradley Co.
v. Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797, 799 (1945) to hold that a union may not lawfully perform anti-
competitive activities which exceed its own interest. 381 U.S. at 672; see note 4 supra.
381 U.S. at 672-73 (Douglas, J., concurring).
" Id at 673 (Douglas, J., concurring). In Pennington, Justice Douglas defined what has
become known as predatory intent as an agreement made for, the purpose of driving some
employers out of business. Id Justice Douglas implied that courts may infer a union's
predatory intent from the parallelism of a union's wage demands and those of the multi-
employer group agreement, so long as those wage demands exceed the financial ability of
some employers in the industry. Id.; see DiCola, supra note 37, at 719. The majority opinion
noted, however, that unions should not have to lower their wage demands to meet the
abilities of the weaker employers. 381 U.S. at 665 n.2. In order to prove that the industry
wide collective bargaining agreement violated the antitrust laws, the Court required direct
evidence of a conspiracy, rather than allowing an inference to be drawn from parellelism. Id.
at 665-66.
" 620 F.2d at 432. The Fourth Circuit based the requirement of predatory intent to
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The Fourth Circuit held that the evidence in Smitty Baker did not
satisfy the Pennington requirements.'2 Considering the first two factors
together, the court concluded that the UMW did not intentionally agree
with BCOA to a wage scale that Smitty Baker could not afford. 3 The
court reasoned that Smitty Baker had operated profitably under the old
contract and had not demonstrated that the higher wages in the new
contract would end the company's profitability. 4 Smitty Baker also
failed to prove that the UMW agreed with BCOA, through the Protec-
tive Wage Clause, to impose the wage scale on Smitty Baker.'5 The court
noted that the UMW and BCOA had expressly rescinded the PWC
several years prior to drafting the current agreement. 8 The court con-
cluded that the union's unilateral attempt to impose a uniform wage
scale in the industry is a legitimate union practice under Pennington"'
and not a covert continuance of the PWC because the union was willing
to make variations from the uniform wage scale if necessary. 8 Consider-
ruin competitors on other court's interpretations of Pennington. The Sixth Circuit, hearing
Pennington on remand, interpreted the Supreme Court's opinion to require predatory in-
tent. Lewis v. Pennington, 400 F.2d 806, 814 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 983 (1969).
In Ramsey v. UMW, 344 F. Supp. 1029, 1033 (E.D. Tenn. 1972), the district court concluded
that Pennington did not require a showing of predatory intent, but did require a showing
that the wage scale imposed was ruinous to other employers. The Fourth Circuit correctly
discounted the difference in nomenclature and concluded that Ramsey required predatory
intent. 620 F.2d at 431-32. The Sixth Circuit also reconciled Ramsey and Pennington by
overcoming the differences in terminology. South East Coal Co. v. Consolidated Coal Co.,
434 F.2d 767, 776-77 (6th Cir. 1970). The Fourth Circuit in Smitty Baker also found Ten-
nessee Consolidated Coal Co. v. UMW, 416 F.2d 1192 (6th Cir. 1969) to be consistent with
the requirement of predatory intent because the Sixth Circuit had previously required
predatory intent and did not abandon the requirement in Consolidated Coal. 620 F.2d at
432.
42 Id. at 435.
Id. at 433.
" Id. at 435. The Smitty Baker court noted that Smitty Baker would have earned
arguably excessive profits had the old contract been reinstituted. Id. at 433. The Smitty
Baker court inferred that Baker could meet the terms of the new contract because Baker
refused to open his books to prove otherwise. Id. at 434. The duty to collectively bargain in
good faith, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d), requires an employer to open his books so that the union may
negotiate on an equal basis. See notes 1 & 22 supra.
"5 620 F.2d at 434. In all prior cases involving Pennington-type claims, the plaintiffs
had premised their antitrust claims on the Protective Wage Clause. See, e.g., South East
Coal Co. v. Consolidated Coal Co., 434 F.2d 767 (6th Cir. 1970); Tennessee Consolidated Coal
Co. v. UMW, 416 F.2d 1192 (6th Cir. 1969); Ramsey v. UMW, 344 F. Supp. 1029 (E.D. Tenn.
1972).
'a 620 F.2d at 434. In 1968, the UMW and BCOA expressly voided the Protective Wage
Clause in order to avoid any new antitrust claims which might arise from its continued ex-
istence. Id.
Id. The Pennington Court expressly noted that a union's unilateral maintenance of a
uniform wage scale is not an antitrust question. 381 U.S. at 665 & n.2.
"8 620 F.2d at 484. The union in Smitty Baker offered a variety of concessions during
the negotiations which indicated a willingness to bargain. See text accompanying notes
20-23 supra.
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ing the final Pennington factor, the court concluded that the UMW did
not intend to eliminate Smitty Baker because Smitty Baker was finan-
cially able to meet the terms which the UMW offered. 9 The Fourth Cir-
cuit noted that although Smitty Baker's claims did not amount to a
Pennington-type antitrust violation,' the claims might be interpreted as
an unfair labor practice claim due to the union's failure to notify Smitty
Baker of the strike.5
In Smitty Baker, the Fourth Circuit correctly interpreted the Penn-
ington doctrine to require a showing of predatory intent in order to
prove that an industry-wide collective bargaining agreement violates
the antitrust laws.2 The Fourth Circuit's conclusion is consistent with
the Supreme Court's subsequent treatment of Pennington' as well as
with the other circuits that have interpreted Pennington." Predatory in-
620 F.2d at 435.
o Id. The Fourth Circuit also considered the Coal Lands Clause in the UMW - BCOA
agreement, which prevented the lessor from escaping his obligation to deal with UMW by
leasing his lands to another party not a signatory to the contract. Id. at 436-47. The court
held that the clause did not cbnstitute an antitrust violation under Pennington. Id. The
court indicated that the clause was not an attempt to ruin a competitor because it bound only
the signatories to the contract and did not harm the plaintiffs business. Id. at 437.
In addition, the Coal Lands Clause is valid under the labor doctrine of successorship.
See generally 4 KHEEL, LABOR LAW § 17 (1979 ed.). A successor employer like Smitty Baker
is bound to bargain with the union of his predecessor's employees unless the union is no
longer supported by a majority of the employees. See Rohlik, Inc., 145 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1964).
In addition, the successor employer may affirmatively assume the obligation to adhere to
the predecessor's agreement. See Celanese Corp. of Am. 95 N.L.R.B. 664 (1951).
1, 620 F.2d at 435. Baker may have a claim under § 303 of the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act, 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1976), for breach of contract because the union failed to notify him
of the strike. Unfair labor practice claims, however, are not within the purview of the an-
titrust laws unless the disputed activity also restraints competition. Larry R. George Sales
Co. v. Cool Attic Corp., 587 F.2d 266, 274 (5th Cir. 1979).
1 The Fourth Circuit relied on Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in Pennington to
support the predatory intent requirement. See text accompanying notes 32-40 supra.
I On remand to the district court following the Supreme Court's decision in Penn-
ington, the district court judge concluded that predatory intent is a necessary element of an
antitrust claim against a labor union. Lewis v. Pennington, 257 F. Supp. 815, 829 (E.D. Tenn.
1966). The district court therefore adhered to Justice Douglas' concurrence in Pennington.
See DiCola, supra note 37, at 726 & 739. On a second appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the
district court's adoption of Justice Douglas' approach. 400 F.2d 806, 814 (6th Cir. 1968). The
Supreme Court apparently agreed that predatory intent is a necessary element because the
Court twice refused to rehear the Pennington case. Lewis v. Pennington, 400 F.2d 806, cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 983, reh. denied, 393 U.S. 1045 (1969).
" The Third, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits adopted Justice Douglas' requirement
of predatory intent in Pennington-type cases. See, e.g., Consolidated Express, Inc. v. N.Y.
Shipping Ass'n, 602 F.2d 494, 516 (3d Cir. 1979) (agreements on mandatory subjects of collec-
tive bargaining must show predatory intent for antitrust liability); Embry-Riddle
Aeronautical Univ. v. Ross Aviation, Inc., 504 F.2d 896, 903 (5th Cir. 1974) (nonexemption
and liability based on union's purpose to eliminate competitive company of employer);'
Associated Milk Dealers, Inc. v. Milk Drivers Union Local 753, 422 F.2d 546, 554 (7th Cir.
1970) (most favored nation clauses require predatory purpose to violate antitrust laws).
1981]
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tent is a necessary element of a union's antitrust violation because
without that requirement, industry-wide collective bargaining
agreements would be per se violations of the antitrust laws.' If courts
did not require predatory intent, a union could violate the antitrust laws
by demanding a uniform wage rate which incidentally would harm com-
petitors." The Supreme Court has noted that a union should not be forced
to lower its demands because an employer has a weak financial
position. 7 Without a requirement of predatory intent, a union would risk
antitrust liability every time a firm loses money and has the opportunity
to blame the loss on the union's attempt to equalize wages in the in-
dustry. Since both the Supreme Court and Congress have recognized the
redeeming value of labor organizations and collective bargaining and
have intervened to protect unions from the unbridled application of the
antitrust laws, a per se rule for unions is too stringent. 9
A per se rule is not only inappropriate for unions in general, but also
is inappropriate for the particular anticompetitive activity alleged in
Smitty Baker. The anticompetitive activity claimed in both Pennington
and Smitty Baker resulted from an agreement that had industry-wide ef-
Lewis v. Pennington, 400 F.2d 806, 814 (6th Cir. 1968) (predatory intent is necessary ele-
ment of union's antitrust violation); see note 53 supra.
In prior Fourth Circuit cases involving Pennington, the Fourth Circuit did not discuss
predatory intent. See, e.g., Webb v. Bladen, 480 F.2d 306, 308 (4th Cir. 1973) (citing Penn-
ington for general labor immunity when union acts alone); Consolidated Coal Co. v. Disabled
Miners of S.W. Va., 442 F.2d 1261, 1266 (4th Cir. 1971) (citing Pennington for exception to
labor exemption when union pursues non-labor goals). See also DiCola, supra note 37, at 739;
Meltzer, Labor Unions, Collective Bargaining and the Antitrust Laws, 32 U. CHI. L. REV.
659, 722 (1965); St. Antoine, Connell: Antitrust Law At The Expense of Labor Law, 62 VA.
L. REV. 603, 610 (1976).
" See text accompanying notes 56-59 infra. Only those anticompetitive activities which
are so pernicious as to have no redeeming value are illegal per se. Northern Pacific Ry. v.
United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). See Sullivan, Recent Antitrust Developments: Defining
the Scope of Exemptions, Expanding Coverage, and Refining the Rule of Reason, 27
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 265, 266 (1979). A per se violation is unlawful regardless of the defendant's
motivation, justification, or any countervailing consideration. See United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 220-21 (1940) (no economic justification permitted to show
reasonableness of price fixing scheme).
' See text accompanying note 41 supra. Lacking a predatory intent requirement, the
factors necessary for a Pennington-type violation are satisfied if an industry has a uniform
rate which smaller employers deem excessive. Id.
See 381 U.S. at 665 n.2.
See note 40 supra.
See notes 1-4 supra. In Pennington, Justice Douglas relied on Allen Bradley Co. v.
Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797 (1945), to conclude that the only activity in the labor realm that
is clearly illegal is a business monopoly. 381 U.S. at 674. Activities not so egregious are sub-
ject to ambiguous distinctions between permissive and impermissive activities. Id Courts
assume that in light of the strong labor policies, these activities must exhibit a union's
predatory intent in order to be so unreasonable as to violate the antitrust laws. See id.
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fects without industry-wide input."0 Such an agreement is a business con-
spiracy and is not illegal per se.6 ' When an activity is not illegal per se,
courts must examine the motives of the defendant and search for
predatory intent.2 Absent an intention to ruin competitors, a conspiracy
to restrain competition in violation of the antitrust laws does not exist."
In Smitty Baker, the Fourth Circuit held that the UMW and BCOA
did not conspire to restrain competition by enforcing an industry-wide
wage agreement. The court accurately interpreted the Pennington'
precedent to require that a plaintiff must prove that the agreement is in-
fected with the union's predatory intent to eliminate competitors in the
industry. 5 The Fourth Circuit's emphasis on predatory intent as an
essential element of a union's antitrust violation preserves the delicate
balance between the antitrust and labor policies. By requiring the
plaintiff in Smitty Baker to demonstrate predatory intent by the union,
the Fourth Circuit has established precedent that properly allows unions
to pursue legitimate anticompetitive goals without completely removing
union activity from antitrust scrutiny.67
LIZANNE THOMAS
The wage agreement itself is, concededly, a price-fixing arrangement, which is or-
dinarily illegal per se. SeeUnited States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 220 (1940)
(price fixing inherently unreasonable and per se violation). Nevertheless, price fixing itself
is not the alleged anticompetitive activity, nor should it be, because wage fixing is exempt
from the antitrust laws as a mandatory subject of collective bargaining. See Apex Hosiery
Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 473 (1940); note 4 supra.
1 Business conspiracies are those restraints of trade which are not classified as per se
violations of the antitrust laws. See, e.g., United States v. Parke-Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29,
47 (1960) (acquiescence by retailer group to minimum resale prices); Interstate Circuit, Inc.
v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 230 (1939) (conscious parallelism in method of distribution);
see DiCola, supra note 37, at 739.
" See Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 57-58 (1911). The rule of
reason analysis requires a court to investigate the purposes of the anticompetitive activities
the economic strength of the parties involved, and the resulting effect on competition. Id. at
99 (Harlan, J., concurring & dissenting).
' See Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 221 (1939) (motive an
essential element of illegal conspiracy); note 62 supra.
620 F.2d at 438.
Id. at 432. See text accompanying notes 38-41, 52-54 supra.
See text accompanying notes 56-59 supra. Smitty Baker has been cited by two
district courts as an accurate explication of Pennington, and both courts read Pennington as
requiring predatory intent. Feather v. UMW, 494 F. Supp. 701, 714 (W.D. Pa. 1980); Theatre
Techiniques, Inc. v. United Scenic Artists, No. 76-5417 (S.D. N.Y. June 27, 1980).
" See notes 2 & 3 supra.
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B. The Sherman Act Applies to Physicians Administering
Blue Shield Plans
The Sherman Antitrust Act encourages free competition' by pro-
hibiting every contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade.2
An extremely broad interpretation of the Act would prohibit almost all
business agreements.' The Supreme Court, however, has construed the
Act narrowly to prohibit only those business agreements which are
unreasonable restraints of trade.' Congress also has limited the scope of
the Act by devising a statutory antitrust exemption for insurance
because unrestrained competition in the insurance industry works
against the public interest.' In Virginia Academy of Clinical Psycholo-
The philosophical basis for free competition is individual liberty. See generally
Hamilton, Common Right; Due Process and Antitrust, 7 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 24, 27-28
(1940). The most basic constitutional protection of an individual's freedom is the fourteenth
amendment to the Constitution, which states in relevant part that "[n]o state shall deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV
§1.
, Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). The Sherman Act prohibits "every con-
tract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several states .... 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). The Act is a codification of the
common law of antitrust. 21 CONG. REC. 2456 (1890). The common law of antitrust was
designed to prevent industrial monopolization, an evil that Americans inherited from the
English. See Jones, Historical Development of the Law of Business Competition, 36 YALE
L.J. 42, 55 (1926). Following the Civil War, United States industry grew significantly. The
rapid growth concentrated economic power in a smaller number of businesses. The courts
were unable to eliminate the ensuing trade restraints because the common law of antitrust
lacked uniformity and did not cover interstate transactions. 16 VON KALINOWSKI, BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS: ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION §§ 1.02[4] & 2.02[1], [2] (rev. ed.
1979).
In response to the public's demand for effective federal enforcement, Congress
enacted the Sherman Act to provide a uniform set of antitrust laws and sanctions. Id See
also Note, Application of the Antitrust Laws to Anticompetitive Activities by Physicians,
30 RUTGERS L. REV. 991, 991 & n.2 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Anticompetitive Activities].
I The literal language of § 1 of the Sherman Act makes virtually every business
agreement illegal because a business removes itself from competition every time it agrees
to deal with one business as opposed to any other. See Anticompetitive Activities, supra
note 2, at 1003 & n.79. The Supreme Court has stated that courts must give content to the
Sherman Act by defining its imprecise terms. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469,
472-73 (1940).
See Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 57-58 (1911) (Sherman Act
follows common law approach that only unreasonable restraints of trade are unlawful);
Masterson, Antitrust Law Commentary, 44 BROOKLYN L. REV. 801, 805 (1978).
' The McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1976) provides in relevant
part:
§ 1011. Congress hereby declares that the continued regulation and taxation by
the several States of the business of insurance is in the public interest, and that
silence on the part of the Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to
the regulation or taxation of such business by the several States.
§ 1012(a). The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be
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gists v. Blue Shield of Virginia,6 the Fourth Circuit considered the ap-
plicability of the insurance exemption to Blue Shield plans which pre-
vent psychologists from competing with physician psychiatrists.' By
focusing on the physicians who administered the Blue Shield plans, the
subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation
of such business.
(b). No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede
any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of in-
surance ....
§ 1013(b). Nothing contained in this chapter shall render the said Sherman Act in-
applicable to any agreement to boycott, coerce or intimidate, or act of boycott,
coercion, or intimidation.
Until 1944, the Supreme Court consistently held that insurance was not an article of
commerce and that therefore insurance practices were not within the scope of federal an-
titrust laws. See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 183 (1869). In the absence of federal
intervention, the states constructed elaborate regulatory systems for the insurance in-
dustry. Under the benign supervision of the states, insurers became accustomed to such
overtly anticompetitive practices as setting prices in concert. See Sullivan, Recent An-
titrust Developments: Defining the Scope of Exemptions, Expanding Coverage and Refin-
ing the Rule of Reason, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 265, 270 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Sullivan]. In
1944, the Supreme Court reversed its position and held that insurance constitutes an article
of commerce and therefore is subject to federal intervention and the antitrust laws. United
States v. South Eastern Underwriters' Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 553 (1940) (group of insurance
companies violate Sherman Act by maintaining arbitrary and noncompetitive premium
rates).
Both the states and insurance companies sought a congressional exemption for the in-
surance industry by arguing that federal regulation usurped the state's role as regulator
and is disruptive and unfair to the insurance industry. Insurance companies strongly
asserted the need for cooperative action within the industry, regardless of its anti-
competitive effects. Insurance firms claimed that they needed to exchange loss data and
trends, pool risks, and arrange reinsurance agreements to maintain the accuracy essential
to success in the industry. See Sullivan, supra, at 273.
Congress intended the McCarran Act to preserve the states' authority to regulate and
tax the insurance industry. See 90 CONG. REC. 8054 (1944). As a consequence of the Act, Con-
gress provided a limited exemption from the federal antitrust laws for the business of in-
surance. 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1976).
Other exceptions to the antitrust laws are based on a variety of factors. For example,
the disparity of economic power between two competing groups has given rise to exemp-
tions for labor organizations. See The Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976); Norris-LaGuardia
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). See also Local 189, Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676
(1965). Industries that are extensively regulated by the federal government are exempt if
their anticompetitive activities are authorized by the regulatory agency. See Clayton Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 19 (1976) (exempting conduct ordered by Federal Reserve Board, Interstate
Commerce Commission, and Securities and Exchange Commission). In order to maintain
constitutionally appropriate federal-state relations, the Supreme Court exempted state
government activity from antitrust scrutiny. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-51 (1943);
see notes 13 & 14 infra. The Supreme Court also created an exemption to protect the first
amendment right to petition when that exercise has incidental adverse effects on competi-
tion. UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 669-672 (1965); Eastern R.R. Presidents' Conference
v. Noeer Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 135-136 (1961); see notes 13 & 14 infra.
624 F.2d 476 (4th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 484.
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Fourth Circuit indicated that physicians who enter business must
adhere to the court's conception of reasonable competition for the
medical industry.'
The Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists (VACP) and Robert
J. Resnick, a practicing psychologist, brought suit in the Eastern
District of Virginia against two Virginia Blue Shield plans and the
Neuropsychiatric Society of Virginia (NSV) for violation of Section 1 of
the Sherman Act.' After consultation with various provider groups, in-
cluding NSV, the two Blue Shield defendants had implemented a policy
of refusing to pay psychologists for services rendered unless the ser-
vices were supervised and billed through a physician."0 The plaintiffs
alleged that the Blue Shield defendants conspired to restrain trade
through the indirect payment policy.11 The district court held that the
defendants had not conspired to restrain trade in violation of the Sher-
man Act. 2 The court concluded that even if Blue Shield's activities
violated the Sherman Act, the insurance exemption barred any antitrust
action against the defendants."3
See text accompanying notes 27-30 infra.
624 F.2d at 478. See text accompanying notes 12-13 infra. The two Blue Shield defen-
dants were Blue Shield of Virginia [BSV or the Richmond Plan] and Blue Shield of South-
western Virginia [BSSV or the Roanoke Plan]. The Neuropsychiatric Society of Virginia is
the professional organization of Virgina psychiatrists.
"1 624 F.2d at 478. In addition to the defendant Neuropsychiatric Society of Virginia,
Blue Shield consulted the Medical Society of Virginia, the Virginia Psychological Associa-
tion, the Virginia Institute of Pastoral Care, psychiatric social workers, and nurses on the
merits of the indirect payment policy. Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue
Shield of Virginia, 469 F. Supp. 552, 558 (E.D. Va. 1979), modified, 624 F.2d 476 (4th Cir.
1980). After these consultations, Blue Shield established a policy that permitted payment to
a psychotherapist under the medical plans only when the services were ordered, supervised
and billed through a physician. 469 F. Supp. at 556.
Subsequently, the Virginia legislature enacted a Freedom of Choice statute, which re-
quires prepaid medical plans like Blue Shield to make payments directly to psychologists for
their services. VA. CODE § 38.1-824 (Repl. Vol. 1978).
1, 624 F.2d at 478. Virginia's Blue Shield plans traditionally provide coverage for out-
patient psychotherapy performed by psychologists or psychiatrists. Id. Virginia's clinical
psychologists are licensed to perform out-patient psychotherapy in the treatment of mental
and nervous disorders, VA. CODE §§ 54-273(10) (Repl. Vol. 1978).
12 469 F. Supp. at 558-59. The district court framed the issues as whether the policy
was a result of a combination or conspiracy and whether the practice constituted a boycott.
Id. at 555. As between NSV and Blue Shield, the court found no agreement that would fulfill
the Sherman Act requirement of a combination in restraint of trade. Id. at 558. As for collu-
sion between the two Blue Shield plans, the court noted that the plans engaged in only two
instances of joint suspect activity, both of which were exempt from the antitrust laws. Id. at
556-58; see note 13 infra.
469 F. Supp. at 563. The court held that although reasonable conditional refusals to
deal were proper, unreasonable refusals to deal constituted a boycott. Id. The court noted
that Blue Shield conditioned the refusal to deal on conditions which were reasonable, and
therefore the policy was not a boycott under the McCarran Act. Id.; see notes 5 supra & 20
infra.
The district court applied two exemptions in addition to the McCarran exemption to
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Although the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court holding that
the relationship between NSV and Blue Shield was not a conspiracy
under the Act, the Fourth Circuit held that the Blue Shield plans
themselves, as combinations of physicians, were subject to the Act." The
court reasoned that the Blue Shield plans were merely agents of the
member physicians because physicians dominated the Blue Shield board
of directors and controlled the daily operation of the Blue Shield plans. 5
protect Blue Shields' activities. The Blue Shield defendants had agreed to challenge the
Freedom of Choice statute. 469 F. Supp. at 556-57; see note 10 supra. A Blue Shield
subscriber and her psychologist brought action in state court against the Richmond Blue
Shield plan, but the action was later voluntarily non-suited. 624 F.2d at 478. The district
court held that Blue Shield's challenge of the statute was protected activity under the first
amendment through the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. 469 F. Supp. at 557.
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine protects anticompetitive activity from the antitrust
laws when that activity is covered by the first amendment right to petition. Id. The doctrine
arose from Supreme Court decisions holding that collaboration in obviously anticompetitive
advertising campaigns, lobbying efforts, and litigation is protected by the first amendment
and therefore outside the scope of the Sherman Act. See UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657,
669-72 (1965); Eastern R.R. President's Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127,
135-36 (1961). See generally Holzer, An Analysis for Reconciling the Antitrust Laws With
the Right to Petition: Noerr-Pennington in Light of Cantor v. Detroit Edison, 27 EMORY L.J.
673, 674 (1978). See also California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508
(1972); note 5 supra.
The district court in Virginia Academy held that the second activity, an anticompeti-
tive agreement between the plans arising out of the administration of national accounts,
was protected under the state action exemption because the accounts are subject to state
regulation. 469 F. Supp. at 557. The Supreme Court created the state action exemption for
activities sufficiently regulated by the state to obviate federal intervention. Parker v.
Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-51 (1943). The district court noted that state regulation included a
state law which divided the state into service areas for the administration of group ac-
counts. 469 F. Supp. at 557; see note 5 supra. See generally Vinyard & Smith, Status Con-
trols or State Action Immunity: Unattractive Alternatives for Regulating Insurers, 15
FORUM 406 (1980).
" 624 F.2d at 479-80. On the issue of collaboration between the two Blue Shield defen-
dants, the Fourth Circuit disagreed with the district court and held that none of the exemp-
tions applied to the defendant's activities. Id. at 482. The Fourth Circuit held that the state
action exemption was inapplicable because the state did not compel Blue Shield to deny
direct payment to psychologists. Id. at 482 & n.10; see notes 5 & 13 supra; Cantor v. Detroit
Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 595 (1976). See also California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n. v. Mid-
cal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 106 (1980). The Fourth Circuit relied on Cantor in holding
that the state had not compelled Blue Shield to adopt the plans. 624 F.2d at 479-80. Accord,
Ballard v. Blue Shield of S.W. Va., Inc., 543 F.2d 1075, 1079 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430
U.S. 922 (1977). In Ballard, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that Blue Shield cannot claim the
state action exemption because the state did not require Blue Shield to exclude chiroprac-
tors from the plans. 543 F.2d at 1079.
The Fourth Circuit also determined that Blue Shield's activities were not protected
under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine since people must act upon the first amendment right
to petition, not merely assert the right, in order to invoke the Noerr-Pennington exemption.
624 F.2d at 482. See Feminist women's Health Center, Inc. v. Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530, 542
(5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 924 (1979); see notes 5 & 13 supra.
15 624 F.2d at 481. Virginia statutes authorizing Blue Shield plans treat them as agen-
cies of the member physicians. VA. CODE § 38.1-811 (Repl. Vol. 1978). The statute requires
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Since Blue Shield was merely an agent of its member physicians and was
not an independent competitive entity, the court held that the Act ap-
plied to anticompetitive activities of the administering physicians.'"
After determining that the Blue Shield plans were subject to the an-
titrust laws, the Fourth Circuit next addressed the issue whether the
statutory insurance exemption under the McCarran-Ferguson Act 7 pro-
tected the Blue Shield plans from antitrust scrutiny. 8 The McCarran-
Ferguson Act exempts certain anticompetitive activities by insurance
companies which would otherwise be unreasonable restraints of trade
violative of the Sherman Act. 9 The McCarran Act exemption does not
cover all insurance company activity. Only those activities which con-
stitute the business of insurance are protected by the exemption." The
Supreme Court has narrowly construed the business of insurance re-
quirement by holding that underwriting or the spreading of risk is an in-
dispensable element of the business of insurance.2' The Supreme Court
that the majority of the board of directors of Blue Shield consist of health care providers.
VA. CODE § 38.1-817 (Repl. Vol. 1978). Cf. Blue Cross v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 180, 189, 176
S.E.2d 439, 445 (1970) (Blue Cross is combination of member hospitals).
" 624 F.2d at 481.
1.7 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1976); see note 5 supra.
624 F.2d at 483.
19 See note 5 supra.
15 U.S.C. § 1012(a) (1976). Prior to 1969, courts defined the "business of insurance" as
all of the activities in which an insurance company might participate. See, e.g., FTC v. Na-
tional Cas. Co., 357 U.S. 560, 564 (1958) (selling and advertising policies is business of in-
surance); California League of Independent Insurance Producers v. Aetna Cas. & Surety
Co., 175 F. Supp. 857, 860 (N.D. Cal. 1959) (fixing agents' commissions is business of in-
surance). The Supreme Court narrowed the meaning of the business of insurance in SEC v.
National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 459-460 (1969), to focus on the relationship between
the insurer and the policyholder, so that third party agreements are not the business of in-
surance. See Borsody, The Antitrust Laws and Health Industry, 12 AKRON L. REV. 417,
441-42 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Borsody].
The McCarran Act also requires that the state regulate the activity so that federal
government supervision in the form of antitrust regulation is superfluous. 15 U.S.C. §
1012(b) (1976). State regulation under the McCarran Act requires no more than statutory
authorization to regulate so that legislation permitting the activity was sufficient. Crawford
v. American Title Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 217, 220 (5th Cir. 1975).
Under the McCarran Act, the activity must not involve a boycott or an act of coercion
or intimidation. 15 U.S.C. § 1013(b) (1976). The boycott exception includes boycotts aimed at
policyholders as well as those aimed at competitors. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.
Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 552-555 (1978). Conditional refusals by an insurer to deal with a group of
equal providers constitutes a boycott. Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 561 F.2d
262 (D.C. Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 440 U.S. 942 (1979).
21 Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 211-15 (1979). In Royal
Drug, the Supreme Court held that provider agreements between pharmacies and Blue
Shield are not the business of insurance. Id. at 233. The plaintiffs in Royal Drug were phar-
macies which did not participate in the agreements to provide discount prescriptions with
Blue Shield. The plaintiffs alleged that the parties to the provider agreements fixed retail
prices of drugs and that the agreements caused Blue Shield policyholders to boycott the
nonparticipating pharmacies. Id. at 207. The defendants claimed that the McCarran Act im-,
munized them from antitrust coverage. Id.
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has also indicated that the exemption should apply only to agreements
between the insurer and the insured and not to agreements between the
insurer and third parties.'
In Virginia Academy, the Fourth Circuit concluded that Blue
Shield's indirect payment policy was not the business of insurance.' The
court noted that the indirect payment policy involved no initiation of
risk underwriting because Blue Shield had assumed the risk of covering
psychological disorders over ten years prior to instituting the policy."
The Fourth Circuit also noted that Blue Shield's payment policy was
merely tangential to the insurer-insured relationship because the in-
sured patient receiving psychotherapy was unaware of Blue Shield's
method of reimbursing the psychologist.' Since the payment policy was
not the business of insurance, the Fourth Circuit held that the McCarran
Act exemption was inapplicable.28
After holding that the indirect payment policy was not exempt from
antitrust scrutiny, the Fourth Circuit considered whether the payment
policy so unreasonably restrained trade as to violate Section 1 of the
Sherman ActY The Fourth Circuit concluded that the indirect payment
policy was unreasonable because it forced a psychologist either to serve
under a physician or to work independently and lose patients covered by
Blue Shield.' In either case, the psychologist lost his competitive posi-
tion in the psychotherapy field because he could no longer offer services
comparable to those of psychiatrists.' The Fourth Circuit concluded that
The Court reasoned that the McCarran Act exemption applies to the business of in-
surance, not the business of insurers. Id. at 211. See generally Nedrow, The McCarran Con-
troversy: Insurance and the Antitrust Law, 12 CONN. L. REv. 205, 229 (1980). If an insurer
attempts to control a non-insurance market through provider agreements, he has left the
business of insurance. 440 U.S. at 232. In SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65,
71-73 (1959), the Supreme Court noted that the business of insurance involves some invest-
ment risk taking on the part of the company. See Borsody, supra note 20, at 442.
' 440 U.S. at 216-17. Statutory exemptions from the antitrust laws should be narrowly
construed. Abbott LaboratQries v. Portland Retail Druggists Ass'n, Inc., 425 U.S. 1, 11-12
(1975). Provider agreements are subject to close scrutiny under the antitrust laws because
they are attenuated from the actual business of insuring. See generally Havighurst, Profes-
sional Restraints on Innovation in Health Care Financing, 1978 DUIJE L.J. 303, 326-27 (1978).
624 F.2d at 483-84; see notes 20 & 21 supra.
24 624 F.2d at 484.
5 Id. Provider agreements, such as provisions for psychologists to perform
psychotherapy for Blue Shield patients, are third party agreements only tangentially
related to the actual business of insurance, notwithstanding that they may be prudent com-
mercial endeavors. See note 21 supra.
' 624 F.2d at 483-84. The Fourth Circuit in Virginia Academy did not address the
state regulation requirement or the boycott exception to the McCarran Act exemption
because the policy was not the business of insurance and the McCarran Act was inapplicable
on that basis alone. See note 20 supra.
', 624 F.2d at 484-86.
Id. at 485.
Id. The Virginia legislature tacitly encourages competition between psychologists
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Blue Shield's indirect payment policy was an unreasonable restraint of
competition and therefore a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act."
Courts addresssing the effects of anticompetitive activity use a rule
of reason analysis to consider defenses and mitigating circumstances for
those activities which are not illegal per se.' The Supreme Court refined
the rule of reason for professional activities in National Society of Pro-
fessional Engineers v. United States.2 In Professional Engineers, the
Supreme Court held that courts should focus on the challenged prac-
tice's impact upon competitive conditions.' If the activity unreasonably
restraints competition, the activity is illegal notwithstanding the profes-
sional group's arguably valid purpose.' The Professional Engineers rule
of reason varies from the traditional rule of reason, which required
courts to look for an arguably valid non-commercial purpose behind any
professional association's anticompetitive activity without presuming
and psychiatrists in the field of out-patient psychotherapy through the Freedom of Choice
statute. See VA. CODE § 38.1-824 (Repl. Vol. 1978); note 10 supra.
' 624 F.2d at 485-86. The Fourth Circuit remanded the case to the district court for
determination of appropriate relief. Id. at 486.
The Supreme Court in Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911),
first articulated the rule of reason analysis. The rule of reason requires a court to in-
vestigate the purpose of the anticompetitive activities, the economic strength of the parties
involved, and the resulting effect on competition. Id. at 64-65. In United States v. E.I. Du-
Pont deNemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 386-87 (1956), the Court noted that the rule of reason
should be applied on a case by case basis.
The rule of reason may be applied only when an activity is not illegal per se. In Nor-
thern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), the Court set forth the classic definition
of an activity which is per se illegal. Per se violations are those activities which have a per-
nicious effect on competition without any redeeming virtues. Id. at 5; see, e.g., United
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 212-13 (1940) (price-fixing); Addyston Pipe &
Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 246 (1899) (horizontal division of markets). See
generally Sullivan, supra note 5, at 266. A per se violation is unlawful regardless of the
defendant's motivation, justification, or any countervailing consideration. See Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 220 (1940) (no economic justification permitted to show
reasonableness of price-fixing scheme).
The Fourth Circuit in Virginia Academy did not use the per se rule because of the
high standards of the medical profession and the need to'balance the interests of the profes-
sion with antitrust policies. See 624 F.2d at 485.
435 U.S. 679 (1978).
Id. at 695-96. In Professional Engineers, the Supreme Court held that the associa-
tion's canon of ethics which prohibits competitive bidding by its members is in violation of
the antitrust laws. Id. at 696. The court relied on the rule of reason to declare that any
unreasonable restraint on competition is unlawful notwithstanding that in particular cases
competition itself may be unreasonable. Id. at 695-96.
Id. The Supreme Court in Professional Engineers destroyed the last vestiges of a
very vague learned professions exemption. Formerly, professions such as law, medicine, and
engineering enjoyed protection from the antitrust laws by virtue of their contributions to
public service and higher standards of performance. See Sullivan, supra note 5, at 308. The
Supreme Court's decision in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) heralded the
beginning of the end for the learned profession exemption by holding that the exemption
has no basis in federal legislation. Id. at 785-88; see Borsody, supra note 20, at 418.
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anticompetitive intent. 5 Courts based the traditional rule of reason on
the rationale that professional groups should have the right to self-
regulate in order to maintain professional standards of practice. 6
Although the Fourth Circuit in Virginia Academy ostensibly relied
on Professional Engineers, the court's analysis is a return to the tradi-
tional rule of reason. Professional Engineers requires courts to look sole-
ly to the anticompetitive effects of an activity." The Fourth Circuit in
Virginia Academy, however, also considered whether Blue Shield could
justify the indirect payment policy. 8 Although Blue Shield attempted to
justify the policy as a prudent medical practice, the court correctly held
that Blue Shield's justification was insufficient because the supervising
physicians were not trained or licensed to do psychotherapy. 9 By men-
tioning the possibility of a valid purpose or goal, however, the Fourth
Circuit has rejuvenated the old rule of reason which Professional
Engineers had made irrelevant." In the future, therefore, professional
organizations may be able to successfully justify an anticompetitive ac-
tivity in the Fourth Circuit by demonstrating that the activity has a
legitimate purpose. 1
Even under the traditional rule of reason, however, physicians who
dominate Blue Shield plans will be unable to justify their anticompeti-
tive activities. The Fourth Circuit in Virginia Academy correctly treated
Blue Shield plans as combinations of physicians rather than as quasi-
insurance companies combining with one another.42 The court reasoned
that the physicians who dominated the Blue Shield board of directors
See note 31 supra.
See Note, The Professions and Noncommercial Purposes: Applicability of Per Se
Rules Under the Sherman Act, 11 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 387, 394 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Noncommercial Purposes]. The Supreme Court presumes that professional organizations
exist for reasons other than the maximization of profit. United States v. Oregon Medical
Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 336 (1952).
See text accompanying notes 32-34 supra.
624 F.2d at 485. Nevertheless, the Virginia Academy court ostensibly relied on the
Professional Engineers analysis by noting that groups of professionals have no right to
determine whether or not competition is ethical or beneficial in their work. Id.
" See Va. Code § 54-273 (Repl. Vol. 1978) (non-psychologists prohibited from perform-
ing psychologists' services).
,0 624 F.2d at 485; see text accompanying note 36 supra.
" The court in Virginia Academy expressly suggested that Blue Shield consider other
methods of cost or quality control. 624 F.2d at 485.
624 F.2d at 479-81. Although the Fourth Circuit has previously held that specific
Blue Shield plans violate the antitrust laws, all of these decisions involved Blue Shield ac-
tivities that were in concert with another party. See Ballard v. Blue Shield of S.W. Va., Inc.,
543 F.2d 1075, 1077 (4th Cir. 1976). Virginia Academy is the first case in which the Fourth
Circuit has held activity by physician members of Blue Shield to be illegal. Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court of Virginia has held that a Blue Cross hospital pre-payment plan violates
the antitrust laws. See Blue Cross v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 180, 189, 176 S.E.2d 439, 445
(1970). Courts in other jurisdictions have not dealt with the issue of antitrust combinations
within Blue ShieldlCross plans. See Havighurst, supra note 22, at 307.
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were responsible for Blue Shield's anticompetitive policies.4 3 By em-
phasizing the problems arising from physician dominance of the Blue
Shield plans, the Fourth Circuit clearly indicated that professionals who
benefit from commercial activity must also bear the burden of competi-
tion and trade regulation."
The Fourth Circuit also properly decided that Blue Shield's quasi-
insurance status would not shield member physician's anticompetitive
activities from antitrust liability. Blue Shield plans do not clearly con-
stitute the business of insurance because Congress did not include
health care organizations such as Blue Shield within its definition of in-
surance for the McCarran Act.4 5 The Supreme Court has, however, re-
ferred to Blue Shield plans as insurance for the purposes of the McCar-
ran Act. 6 The Fourth Circuit in Virginia Academy correctly reconciled
these views by applying the insurance exemption only to the extent that
the Blue Shield plans underwrite risk, which is the essential charac-
teristic of the business of insurance.1
Although Congress exempted the business of insurance from anti-
trust scrutiny, the business of insurance does not include all activity by
physicians relating to compensation for health care.48 Physicians who use
their positions as professionals to eliminate competition by engaging in
commercial activities that lack the characteristics of the business of in-
surance are plainly violating the antitrust laws.49 By holding that Blue
Shield may not lawfully refuse to pay psychologists for services
rendered, the Fourth Circuit in Virginia Academy properly recognized
that the payment policy established by Blue Shield's administering
physicians was subject to antitrust scrutiny as an unreasonable re-
straint on competition." Virginia Academy therefore appropriately
,s See 624 F.2d at 479-80.
" See id. at 481. The Supreme Court has held that the antitrust laws are entirely ap-
plicable to professionals and professional organizations that enter commerce. See Goldfarb
v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791-92 (1975). In addition, the Chairman of the F.T.C. has
noted the prospect for applying the Sherman Act to remove professional control of Blue
Shield plans. Testimony of FTC Chairman Michael Pertschuk Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight & Investigations of the House Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce (Mar.
21, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Pertschuk].
5 See 440 U.S. at 226-27 & n.34. The Supreme Court in Royal Drug indicated that Con-
gress intended the term "business of insurance" to have its commonly understood meaning.
Id. Congress' definition of insurance adhered to the common perception of insurance, which
did not include health care organizations such as Blue Shield. Id.
Id.; see Borsody, supra note 20, at 440.
', See text accompanying note 21 supra.
See text accompanying notes 23-26 supra.
'5 See text accompanying notes 27-30 supra.
See Dolan, Antitrust Law and Physician Dominance of Other Health Practitioners,
4 J. HEALTH. POL., POL'Y. & L. 675, 676 (1980). Professor Dolan argued that physician
dominance of health care organizations results in inefficiency, indifference, and lack of cost-
containment because physicians have no desire to reduce costs or preserve competition. Id.
at 676.
